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Abstract
We analyse the effect of transfer pricing regulations on trade flows. We base
our estimation on a panel gravity model, where the transfer pricing regulations
are modeled as trade costs. To abstract from any aggregate demand shocks, we
focus on intermediate goods in the car industry. Our results suggest a significant
volume effect on the exported quantity as a result of the introduction of transfer
pricing laws in the exporting country. Exports to lower tax rate countries are
reduced, whilst exports to higher tax rate countries are increased. In line with
theory, transfer pricing regulations only play a role if a tax rate difference exists
between the trading partners.
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1 Motivation
In October 2015, the OECD announced the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
action plan, which aims at taxing corporations at the location where production takes
place and preventing MNEs to internationally shift profits. Multinational firms have sev-
eral possibilities to shift profit to affiliates in low tax countries. One of the predominant
tax planning strategies is the manipulation of intra-firm prices. Many countries have
introduced transfer pricing regulations to keep corporate profits within their borders.
Overall, these laws attempt to tie intra-firm prices to arm’s-length equivalents. The
empirical literature has shown that firms manipulate transfer prices for tax optimising
purposes (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Clausing, 2003;
Cristea and Nguyen, 2013; Davies et al., 2015) and that they react sensitive to transfer
pricing regulations (Lohse and Riedel, 2013). While the literature has provided evidence
for the manipulation of intra-firm transfer prices exploiting the pricing mechanism, little
is known about how trade volumes are affected.
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the quantity effects on trade flows that
transfer pricing regulations might have. Under the premise that intra-firm prices did
indeed deviate from their corresponding arm’s-length prices, we assume that prices are
adjusted towards the arm’s-length price when transfer pricing regulations are introduced.
Although this change in prices influences the profits and therefore the tax bases of firms
in the respective countries, which on its own could lead to severe economic consequences,
we argue that a change in trade volume could amplify this effect. In other words, only
considering the pricing channel would lead to an underestimation of the effectiveness
of transfer pricing regulations. In the extreme case, if an affiliate was only held for
tax optimising purposes and intermediate goods were merely imported and reexported,
reoptimisation by the multinational would lead to the abandonment of the affiliate in
that country. An effect of transfer pricing regulations on traded quantities also hints at
allocative inefficiencies that are induced by taxation.1
We base our estimation strategy on the workhorse model of international trade, the
gravity model. First applied by Tinbergen in 1962, it shows that trade between two
countries can be explained by their relative force of gravity, using GDP as the weight of
the countries and distance between them as a negative correction. Baltagi et al. (2003)
develop a panel data gravity model that we adopt here for the use of intermediate goods
trade. Transfer pricing regulations enter the model as one form of trade costs. We
estimate the model using UN COMTRADE data on bilateral exports of intermediate
goods in the car industry for the period 1995 until 2012. The car industry is characterised
by high specialisation and a low share of trade between unrelated third parties, thus
1The effect of taxation on intra-firm trade is documented in Egger and Seidel (2013).
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providing ample opportunities to manipulate transfer prices. The approach taken in
this paper allows us to analyse the effect at the level where the variation in regulations
takes place. Because not all trade activities between countries can be attributed to profit
shifting behaviour, it is important to keep in mind that we will not find results at the
extensive margin of trade but rather at the intensive margin.
Our main findings are as follows: Under the assumption that transfer prices have been
manipulated, the introduction of TPR reduce (increase) trade with countries that have
a lower (higher) tax rate than the exporting country. The effect is driven by the size
of the tax rate differential. In a back-of-the-envelope calculation utilising the value of
trade, we can show that the pricing reaction in our data is in line with the literature
and that the quantity effects found in our study amplify the reaction of firms to TPR,
thus increasing the effectiveness of TPR from a host country perspective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We first describe our data and derive our
hypotheses, before explaining the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results. The final section concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this study comes from the UN COMTRADE database as harmonised
by the CEPII in their BACI database. It provides bilateral trade data at a disaggregated,
6-digit HS goods classification level. We observe all intermediate goods, which enter the
production for motorised vehicles weighing less than 3.5t.2 Considering intermediate
goods trade has an appealing advantage over trade in final goods: It allows us to abstract
from demand shocks that are less pronounced compared to final goods. We focus on the
car industry, which relies on highly specialised intermediate goods and is characterised
by frequent trade between related parties. For example in 2012, the US exports to
related parties accounted for 58.92% of all exports in that year in the car industry3,
which was second only to tobacco products (67.48%).4 Therefore, the manipulation of
transfer prices is relatively easier and we expect a significant reaction to transfer pricing
regulations. The data were merged with information on corporate tax rates coming from
Loretz (2008) as well as KPMG. Data on GDP and economic integration were taken from
the World Bank and the EIA Database respectively.
In order to interpret the effects measured on the country level, it is crucial to under-
stand the type of data observed in the aggregated COMTRADE data. This is depicted
in Figure 1. When a firm wants to sell its products, it has several possibilities regarding
2HS-codes ranging from 870600 to 870899.
3As measured by NAICS4 code: 3361 Motor vehicles
4Data taken from: https://relatedparty.ftd.census.gov/, last accessed 12.10.2017.
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Figure 1: Overview of Trade Data
Notes: The figure shows the types of firms that are observable in the COMTRADE data. Due to the
aggregation, we are not able to differentiate between the types of firms. The solid rectangle represents
the type of firm that is targeted by TPR.
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which markets to serve. The smallest option is to remain national and only serve the
local market. As an example, think of your local bakery. These type of firms do not
engage in international trade and are therefore not observed in our data. Given that
the firm has made a decision to export, it faces two choices: produce local and sell
abroad or produce and sell abroad. The former case is a firm that only has production
within one country. These firms are observed in our data but are not able to utilise tax
rate differences, because all profits accrue within a countries borders.5 Once the firm
decides to produce and sell abroad, it turns into an MNE. The MNE can either trade
with unrelated third parties or intra-firm. Only the latter trade flow can be susceptible
to transfer mis-pricing and could show a reaction to the introduction of TPR. Keeping
this in mind, any reaction found in the data is a lower bound of the real reaction for the
relevant subgroup (intra-firm trade of MNE), given that we also observe trade between
unrelated parties that should not react to TPR.
We hand collected data on introduction of transfer pricing regulations from Deloitte
(2015); Ernst&Young (2014); KPMG (2014) and PWC (2016). For some countries, the
publications offer different years of enactment of transfer pricing regulations and we
chose the most common. When several dates were offered in one publication, we chose
the point in time where mandatory documentation requirements came into place. Table
(1) shows the years in which the exporting countries in our sample introduced transfer
pricing regulations.
We concentrate on data from 1995 until 2012, a period in which many countries in-
troduced transfer pricing regulations, which gives us the variation for identification. We
focus on the 14 most important exporting countries with the largest car industries as
measured by production in 1995 and assess their trade with all other countries of the
world. This gives us confidence that our model captures a great share of worldwide inter-
mediate goods trade in the car industry.6 The BACI data provides us with information
on actual trade flows, but omits zero trade flows. For our analysis however, it is import-
ant to also account for trade flows that did not take place, as these could potentially be
caused by the existence of transfer pricing regulations. Therefore we rectangularise our
data set so that we have observations for each exporter-importer-year combination. All
new observations are assigned a quantity and a value of zero, assuming that if we do not
observe a trade flow, there was none. In an extension, we could explore the possibility
of misreporting by the exporting country by analysing imports of the partner country,
5We are abstracting from within-country differences in corporate taxation that appear in a few federal
countries like Germany, the US and Switzerland, where taxation rights lie with a lower than national
authority.
6The 14 countries had a share in excess of 95% of total car production in 1995(https:
//www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_
transportation_statistics/html/table_01_23.html_mfd. Last accessed 18.06.2017).
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Table 1: Transfer Pricing Regulations
Country TP Regulations
Brazil 1997
Canada 1998
China 2008
France 1996
Germany 2003
India 2001
Italy 2010
Japan 1986
Mexico 1997
Russia –
South Korea 1996
Spain 2006
United Kingdom 1999
United States 1994
which we can use to verify our procedure. We are left with a total of 153 importing
countries for which we have obtained all variables.
3 Hypotheses
To stress the quantity effect and why allocative distortions could exist, consider a rep-
resentative MNE active in the three countries A, B and C. To produce the final good,
only trade in intermediaries from A to B is required. In the absence of taxation or
in the case that all countries set the same corporate tax rate, we would only observe
trade from country A to country B, with country C playing no role. In the presence of
tax rate differences, however, intermediate goods are exported from A to C and then
from C to B for tax optimising purposes. The existence of more intra-firm trade in the
presence of differences in the corporate tax rate is also shown theoretically in Egger and
Seidel (2013). Figure 2 shows such a situation. In order to minimise the tax burden, the
MNE would like profits to accrue in country C. This can be facilitated by undervaluing
exports from A to C and overvaluing exports from C to B.
Now suppose country A introduces transfer pricing regulations. Because C has a lower
tax rate, the exports from country A to country C are undervalued to minimise profits in
A and maximise profits in C. The regulations will force companies in A to increase their
prices, therefore again making the trade via C relatively more expensive. This is the
6
Figure 2: Three Country Model with Tax Rate Differences
A20% B 25%
C
5%
Exports undervalued Exports overvalued
situation that is analysed in the empirical application of this paper.7 This simple illus-
tration shows that no matter which country imposes transfer pricing regulations, there
are incentives for firms to alter the volumes traded between countries, given sufficiently
high trade costs.
A priori, we would expect MNEs to utilise tax rate differences and therefore export
more to countries that have a lower tax rate than the home country. This would indicate
that we should see a negative coefficient for the tax rate difference, when it is non-positive
and a positive coefficient when the tax rate difference is positive. The introduction of
transfer pricing regulations should bring the effects closer together and we expect this to
be strongly driven by the size of the tax rate difference. This corresponds to a positive
coefficient on the interaction of tax rate difference and transfer pricing regulations for
non-positive tax rate differences and a negative effect for this interaction for importers
with a lower tax rate than the exporting country.
4 Estimation Strategy
The gravity model of trade was first introduced by Tinbergen (1962). It applies Newton’s
law of gravity from physics to economics and explains trade between two countries as
proportional to their economic size (GDP) and inversely proportional to the distance
between the two countries. Although the gravity model in its simplest form is able to
explain a substantial amount of trade already, several extensions to the base model exist,
most notably the introduction of trade costs as a second deterring factor of trade and
the inclusion of multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). In
7Transfer pricing regulations in B will require the company in B to pay an arm’s-length price for the
intermediate good imported from C. This will increase profits in B and decrease profits in C, which
also lowers the attractiveness of exporting via country C. Country C benefits from the manipulation
of transfer prices and therefore has no incentive to introduce TPR.
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empirical applications, these are controlled for by adding country fixed effects to the
estimation.
We analyse the relationship between transfer pricing regulations and trade flows using
a gravity-type model of the following form:
Xijt = αl
λ
itm
µ
jtt
β
ijt, (1)
which follows Baltagi et al. (2014) and where Xijt denotes the exports (quantity or value)
from country i to country j at time t. Baltagi et al. (2014) define lit and mjt as exporter-
time-specific and importer-time-specific factors respectively. tijt broadly reflects trade
costs that can possibly vary across all dimensions and λ, µ andβ are measures for the
partial elasticity of trade flows with respect to the respective parameters.
To estimate the model, we impose a logarithmic transformation on Equation (1) and
follow Baltagi et al. (2014) in defining the following set-up for our estimation equation:
ln(Xijt) = α + t
′
ijtβ + λlit + µmjt + uij + δt + εijt, (2)
where uij are country-pair fixed effects, δt represent time fixed effects and εijt is an
error term. To avoid endogeneity problems, it is important that the equation consists
of some components that are exporter-time-specific and importer-time-specific, i.e. lit
and mjt from Equation (1) respectively. Baltagi et al. (2003) propose a generalised
model that accounts for this endogeneity by adding exporter-time and importer-time
fixed effects instead of the simple year fixed effects in Equation (2). A drawback from
this approach, however, is that it does not allow to separately identify the effect of
time-invariant variables. In our application, the variable of interest - transfer pricing
regulations - varies at the exporter-year or importer-year level, that is it would drop from
the estimation due to collinearity. We account for exporter-time-specific and importer-
time-specific factors by including control variables that are either independent of the i
dimension, representing importer-year-specific factors, or the j dimension, representing
exporter-year-specific factors. Furthermore, trade costs are represented by the tax rates
and a transfer pricing regulation dummy, as well as an interaction term between the
two. Our estimation equation thus takes on the following form:
ln(Xijt) =α + β1 ln τit + β2 ln τjt + β3TPRit + β4 ln τit · TPRit+ (3)
EIAijt + λ lnGDPit + µ lnGDPjt + uij + δt + εijt,
where τit and τjt represent the statutory corporate tax rates in country i and j at time t,
respectively, TPRit is a dummy indicating whether transfer pricing regulations were in
place in the exporting country at time t and EIAijt controls for the strength of economic
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integration between i and j through a set of dummies. GDPit and GDPjt are GDP in
the exporting and importing country at time t.8
A regression of Equation (3) using the full sample could be problematic, because the
incentives to shift profits (and possibly quantities) differ depending on the sign of the
tax rate difference between two trading partners. If a positive tax rate difference exists,
firms in country i will have an incentive to shift profits to country j by manipulating the
transfer price downwards, whilst in the case that a negative tax rate difference exists, the
transfer prices should be manipulated upwards. Looking at both cases together could
cancel out any effects of transfer pricing regulations, as we expect opposite reactions
depending on the sign of the tax rate difference. We therefore split the sample into
cases where τi > τj (positive tax difference) and cases where τi < τj (negative tax
difference) and explicitly exclude the case where the tax rates are equal, as profit shifting
opportunities only arise, when a tax rate difference can be utilised.
When analysing worldwide trade, the number of country pair fixed effects to be es-
timated increases rapidly. Also, log-linearisation of the model that is common in the
literature could lead to biased estimates, for example through the mishandling of zero
trade flows. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator that incorporates the multilateral resistance terms and circumvents
the problems arising from log-linearising the model. The results suggest some funda-
mental differences with parameters estimated using the traditional fixed effects method
on log-linearised data. For example, the effect of GDP is not close to one but signific-
antly lower and the effect of geographical distance as well as colonial ties are greatly
exaggerated in the classical log-linearised model. We will therefore report results of es-
timating a traditional fixed effects log-linear gravity model as well as a PPML model
and discuss potential differences between the models.
5 Results
5.1 Effect on Quantities
The baseline results of estimating Equation (3) are shown in Table 2. The observational
unit is a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to importing country j. In total,
we observe N = 26, 419 such pairs. In the first two columns, we regress the logarithm of
quantity only on the logarithm of the tax rates in i and j as well as the control variables.9
8We do not include distance or other time-invariant country pair characteristics that are familiar from
earlier gravity models, because they are collinear to the country pair fixed effect uij.
9Throughout all estimations in this section, the coefficients for lnGDPi/j are positive and significant,
as suggested by economic theory. We cannot report estimates for other common control variables
in the trade literature such as distance, common language or contiguity, because they are captured
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Column (1) shows the results for all country pairs, where the exporting country i has
a higher tax rate than the importing country j. The positive and significant coefficient
on the own tax rate indicates on the one hand that countries with higher tax rates tend
to export more and on the other hand also shows that ceteris paribus i.e. for a given
tax rate of the importing country, an increase in the exporting country’s tax rate leads
to more trade. From an economic point of view, this is a plausible result, because as we
are looking at the sample where τi > τj, any increase in τi will ultimately increase the
tax difference and therefore the incentive to shift profits. The reverse is true for the case
where we have a negative tax difference (τi < τj) and this can be seen in column (2)
with the positive coefficient for τj. The cross tax rates are both negative, which further
enhances the effect of the tax rate difference, but both coefficients are statistically not
distinguishable from zero, thus suggesting that trade flows depend more on the country
with the higher tax rate. The results furthermore show that trade flows differ in a world
where taxation exists from trade flows in a world without (distortive) taxation.
In columns (3) and (4), we introduce a dummy indicating whether TPR were in
place in country i at time t. In case of a positive tax rate difference, transfer pricing
regulations lead to a slight increase in trade. This seems puzzling at first, because we
would have assumed that more quantity was traded than optimally required, prior to
the introduction of TPR and therefore, a reduction of the traded quantities should be
expected. However, the reduction should take place especially with countries that have
a substantially lower tax rate than the exporting country and as trade with the very low
tax rate importing countries declines, trade with the importing countries that are close
to the exporting country in terms of the tax rate could increase. This suggests that the
effect is possibly driven by the tax rate and therefore in columns (5) and (6), we interact
the TPR dummy with the tax rate of the exporting country (5) and importing country
(6) respectively.
by the country-pair fixed effects.
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Table 2: The Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports Exports
τi 1.472
∗∗∗ -0.618 1.770∗∗∗ -0.644 3.357∗∗∗ -0.750 0.449 2.146
(0.538) (1.836) (0.543) (1.825) (0.604) (1.809) (0.461) (1.305)
τj -0.365 3.215
∗∗ -0.380 3.190∗∗ -0.289 4.461∗∗ -0.002 1.058
(0.478) (1.323) (0.474) (1.313) (0.459) (1.751) (0.477) (1.494)
TPRi 0.154
∗∗∗ 0.062 2.545∗∗∗ 0.871 1.198∗∗∗ -0.073
(0.045) (0.085) (0.309) (0.604) (0.288) (0.547)
τi · TPRi -7.984∗∗∗ -3.334∗∗∗
(1.009) (0.841)
τj · TPRi -2.583 -0.008
(1.826) (1.223)
N 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 18,827 6,670
R2 0.227 0.123 0.228 0.124 0.237 0.124 – –
F − Test – – – – 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.339
Notes: Columns (1)-(6): Fixed effects regressions of Equation (3). τi and τj are in logarithms, also in the interaction
term. Columns (7) and (8): PPML estimation. Cluster-Robust standard errors on the country-pair level are in
parentheses. All estimations include the logarithm of GDP for both countries, a set of dummies controlling for
economic integration and year fixed effects as control variables. Coefficients are omitted for brevity. F-Test shows
the p-value for a test of joint significance of the tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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The reaction is indeed driven by the tax rate, as indicated by the statistically signi-
ficant negative coefficient on the interaction variable in column (5). Moreover, we find
that the positive effect of the tax rate on exported quantities found in columns (1) and
(3) was biased downward by country-pairs affected by TPR. An increases in τi of one
percent leads to an increase in exported quantities of 3.36 percent when no TPR are
in place. Likewise, when TPR are in place, an increase of one percent in τi leads to a
decrease in traded quantities of 4.63 percent. When τi < τj though, TPR in country i
do not seem to affect traded quantities as shown in column (4). The interaction effect
with the tax rate of the importing country shows a slight decrease in the quantities
traded when TPR are in place: An increase in the profit shifting incentive of one per-
cent is associated with an increase in traded quantities of 1.88 percent as opposed to
4.46 percent without TPR, but in contrast to the case where τi > τj, the effect remains
positive. A test for joint significance reveals that τj and the interaction term are jointly
significant at the five percent level. To account for the bilateral trade flows over time,
we have relied on clustering the data at the country-pair level. However, as the vari-
ation in our treatment dummy comes from the exporting country side only, we ideally
would like to use cluster-robust standard errors at the exporting country level. Due to
the small number of exporting countries in our sample, standard clustering techniques
are not suited and we employ randomisation inference in the spirit of Fisher (1935) to
calculate valid p-values. The idea behind this inference technique is based on standard
permutation methods: by reassigning treatment randomly across clusters many times,
one gets a self-made distribution under the null hypothesis of no effect.10 This distri-
bution is then used to calculate p-values. Note that in our study, it is the sequence of
the treatment dummy that has to be resampled and not the treatment dummy alone
to avoid unrealistic transfer pricing histories where countries randomly seem to switch
transfer pricing regulations on and off.
Using the specifications from columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, we ran 10,000 replications
to construct a valid distribution of the t-values. From the results, we cannot identify a
robust effect for importing countries that exhibit a higher tax rate than the exporting
country, with the p-value for the interaction between the tax rate and the transfer
pricing regulations being 0.602. But for the opposite case, we find a highly statistically
significant (p = 0.005) reduction of the traded quantities from the exporting countries
to countries with a lower tax rate once transfer pricing regulations are in place.
The estimations in columns (1) to (6) of Table 2 were conducted on log-linearised data
and as pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), due to Jensens inequality, estimates
could be severely biased as additional heterogeneity is introduced into the data that not
only affects the variance but also biases the point estimate. Therefore, we follow the
10For a detailed description see Barrios et al. (2012); Ho and Imai (2006).
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recent advances in the literature and estimate the gravity model in its multiplicative
form, utilising the PPML estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The results
from this exercise are presented in columns (7) and (8). The result from the column
(5) is confirmed that τi has a negative effect once TPR are in place, indicating that less
trade commences when the tax rate difference increases. The effect is smaller in size,
-2.89 percent compared to the -4.63 percent from column (5) for a one percent increase
in τi, but still statistically and economically significant. The difference in coefficient
size is a common finding when comparing results from log-linearised models to models
estimated by PPML and has been at the heart of the critique by Silva and Tenreyro
(2006). Column (8) indicates no effect of TPR on quantities for cases where τi < τj.
This somewhat contrasts the earlier findings and lets us conclude that the significantly
smaller sample size for this relationship affects the OLS estimate. This finding is in line
with Egger and Seidel (2013), who also struggle to find significant results for trade with
countries that exhibit a higher tax rate than the US, due to the significantly smaller
sample size. In summary, the PPML results confirm the qualitative results from the
log-linearised model, namely the importance of TPR as an anti-avoidance measure when
τi > τj, whilst the expected effect for the reverse case cannot be identified from the data.
The coefficients are smaller in size, which is in line with the findings of previous authors
regarding differences between log-linearised models estimated via OLS and multiplicative
models estimated via PPML.
5.2 Effect on Value
The COMTRADE data also include the value of an export. Value is defined as the
product of price and quantity and therefore, the results should show a mixture of the
price and the quantity reaction to the introduction of TPR. Given the way previous
studies have identified the pricing reaction (Clausing, 2003; Lohse and Riedel, 2013),
we would expect to see a decrease in the magnitude of the effect for value when com-
pared to the quantity reaction alone. This is because the pricing and quantity reaction
should have opposite signs: Following the introduction of TPR, prices should be reduced
(increased) and quantities increased (reduced) when exports were overvalued (underval-
ued), Table 3 shows a replication of the quantity regressions from Table 2. The negative
influence of TPR is also visible in column (3) where τi > τj, but no value reaction can be
inferred for the opposite case. As expected from theory, the reduction in value (2.18%)
is smaller than the reduction in quantities (4.63%) following a one percentage point
increase in the tax difference.
Because of the differences found between OLS estimates and PPML estimates in Table
2, we proceed to re-estimate columns (3) and (4) using PPML. The results in columns
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Table 3: The Effect of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports Exports
τi 2.683
∗∗∗ 2.008 4.402∗∗∗ 1.903 -0.138 0.278
(0.577) (1.969) (0.657) (1.947) (0.372) (1.218)
τj -1.580
∗∗∗ 2.626∗ -1.526∗∗∗ 3.515∗∗ -0.452 -1.066
(0.561) (1.384) (0.545) (1.773) (0.467) (1.055)
TPRi 2.182
∗∗∗ 0.650 0.505∗∗ -0.924∗∗
(0.332) (0.631) (0.242) (0.361)
τi · TPRi -6.584∗∗∗ -1.370∗∗
(1.082) (0.689)
τj · TPRi -1.859 1.863∗∗
(1.940) (0.838)
N 19,300 7,119 19,300 7,119 18,827 6,670
R2 0.309 0.145 0.316 0.145 – –
F − Test – – 0.000 0.131 0.052 0.063
Notes: Columns (1)-(4): Fixed effects regressions of Equation (3) using the logarithm of
value instead of quantity as the dependent variable. τi and τj are in logarithms, also in the
interaction term. Columns (5) and (6): PPML estimation. Cluster-Robust standard errors on
the country-pair level are in parentheses. All estimations include the logarithm of GDP for
both countries, a set of dummies controlling for economic integration and year fixed effects as
control variables. Coefficients are omitted for brevity. F-Test shows the p-value for a test of
joint significance of the tax rate and the interaction term. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Price Reaction to TPR
PPML OLS
τi > τj τi < τj τi > τj τi < τj
Quantity Reaction -2.885 1.050 -4.627 1.878
Value Reaction -1.508 0.797 -2.182 1.656
pcrit 0.52 0.76 0.47 0.88
Price Reaction > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Notes: The table shows estimated signs of the price reaction to
the introduction of TPR. The price reaction is conditional on the
price being larger than pcrit.
(5) and (6) differ in size from their OLS counterparts, complementing the findings in
the quantity regressions. Most notably is the joint significance of the tax rate and TPR
in cases where τi < τj. Column (6) shows a significant positive effect of the tax rate
difference on the value of exports that are attributable to the introduction of TPR. This
indicates that the pricing reaction is stronger than the quantity reaction that was not
statistically different from zero in column (8) of Table 2.
5.3 Effect on Prices
Having estimated the effects of TPR on the quantity and value of exports, we would
like to validate that the pricing effect, which is implicitly in the value effect, has the
expected sign. The pricing effect is expected to be positive (negative) when τi > τj
(τi < τj). The magnitude of the value effects is smaller in absolute terms than the
quantity effects in both settings. Table 4 shows the estimated effects that a tax rate
increase has, given that TPR are in place. The coefficients for the PPML columns are
taken from columns (7) and (8) of Table 2 (Quantity) and columns (5) and (6) of Table
3 (Value) respectively. The OLS results are taken from columns (5) and (6) of Table 2
(Quantity) and columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.11 The difference between the quantity
and the value effect is driven by the pricing reaction to taxation. Because
v(τ) = p(τ) · q(τ), (4)
11We focus on the discussion of the PPML results, although the results for OLS are similar and the
arguments brought forward apply idem dito.
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we can decompose the effect of an increase in τ 12 on v(τ) by the total differential to
obtain:
dv(τ) =
∂v
∂p
∂p
∂τ
+
∂v
∂q
∂q
∂τ
. (5)
The partial derivatives of the value with respect to price and quantity are just q(τ)
and p(τ) respectively and both strictly non-negative. Implicitly, we abstract from cross
elasticities of prices and quantities, which should play a smaller role in intermediate
goods trade than in trade in final goods. Additionally, we can justify this by the large
share of intra-firm trade in intermediate goods trade, which amassed to around 45% for
the US in 2013.13 The reaction of the quantity to an increase in τ , measured by ∂q
∂τ
in
Equation (5), is known from the quantity regressions and displayed in the row Quantity
in Table 4. Likewise, the total reaction of the value is also known and displayed in the
row V alue of the table. Taking all information together, we can show that the pricing
effect in the case of τi > τj is given by
∂p
∂τi
=
2.885p− 1.508
q
(6)
and for the opposite case by
∂p
∂τj
=
0.797 − 1.05p
q
. (7)
As soon as p surpasses its critical value of pcrit = 0.52 in Equation (6) or pcrit = 0.76
in Equation (7), we can unambiguously derive the sign of the pricing reaction. In the
former case, ∂p
∂τi
is positive, indicating that prices are corrected upwards when τi increases,
following the introduction of TPR. This is in line with the ex ante manipulation of prices
and the undervaluation of exports in cases where the tax rate of the partner country
is lower than the tax rate of the exporting country. In the latter case, ∂p
∂τj
is negative,
which hints at an overvaluation of exports prior to the introduction of TPR. Back-of-
the-envelope calculations of the average prices in our sample (we simply assume p = v/q)
indicate that only around 0.4% of all prices are below the critical value when τi > τj and
3.9% in the opposite case. In other words, for nearly all observed trade flows, we find
that TPR must have the expected effect on pricing behaviour, namely price increases
when exports are undervalued and price decreases when exports are overvalued.
12Subscripts i and j have, without loss of generality, been dropped for brevity. When τi > τj , the
exposition refers to τi and in the opposite case to τj .
13Own calculation on the basis of data from BEA (intra-firm trade in manufacturing) and WITS (total
trade in intermediate goods).
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5.4 Discussion
The results presented here indicate a substantial response in traded quantities following
the introduction of TPR. They show the presence of allocative inefficiencies through
exploitation of tax rate differentials by MNEs. Our results are consistent with the
hypothesis that TPR help to partly correct these misallocations, as we find a reduction
in traded quantities with countries that have a lower tax rate than the exporting country.
This suggests that part of the trade in intermediate goods between two countries was
purely driven by tax considerations. Following the introduction of TPR, this channel
became unprofitable and we observe relatively more trade with countries that exhibit
a higher tax rate than the exporting country. Egger and Seidel (2013) report a 7%
increase in intra-firm trade as a reaction to a one percentage point increase in the tax
gap between the US and the average host country in their reduced form estimation. The
fact that we find a smaller decrease (2.89%) as a reaction to the introduction of TPR
suggests that TPR fail to fully combat the distortive effects that taxation has on traded
quantities.
Our findings confirm the results from earlier studies on the misuse of transfer prices
on the firm level: Clausing (2003) reports significant distortions of prices and Davies
et al. (2015) find low internal prices for low tax trading partners, especially very low tax
trading partners such as tax havens. We add to this by showing that quantities were
distorted as well, amplifying the effect of TPR. Whilst the manipulation of transfer
prices is de facto a manipulation of bookkeeping, manipulation of quantities can have
real economic consequences such as labour market responses and any regulatory changes
should therefore carefully consider the reaction in quantities.
In line with Lohse and Riedel (2013) and Beer and Loeprick (2015), we can identify
that TPR have a dampening effect on profit shifting behaviour, which is also visible in
traded quantities. Thus, we are able to show that following the introduction of TPR,
quantities exported to lower tax countries are reduced. This could in turn lead to
negative real responses in the respective low tax countries, at least from a global welfare
perspective.
Next to analysing the effect of TPR on quantities in a log-linearised model, we also
showed results from estimations of a multiplicative model via PPML. As advocated by
Silva and Tenreyro (2006), OLS estimates of the log-linearised model could be severely
biased and although we found significant quantitative differences in the estimated coef-
ficients arising from this, the qualitative results remain the same. This is in line with
several previous studies from the international trade literature that compared OLS and
PPML results, such as Baltagi et al. (2014), Go´mez-Herrera (2013) and Silva and Ten-
reyro (2011).
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Utilising the value of exports, we were able to identify the sign of the pricing reaction.
In cases where there was an incentive to undervalue exports in order to minimise profits
accrued in the exporting country, we find a positive pricing reaction following the intro-
duction of TPR. Likewise, when an incentive existed to overvalue exports, because the
exporting nation was the country with the lowest tax rate, TPR seem to correct prices
downward. Both results resemble the findings of earlier studies, for example Lohse and
Riedel (2013), Zinn et al. (2014) or Cristea and Nguyen (2013).
6 Conclusion
We analyse the effect of transfer pricing regulations on international trade flows in in-
termediate goods. We exploit bilateral trade data for the automobile industry from the
BACI database for the years 1995 to 2012, as well as information on the introduction
of transfer pricing regulations. We find evidence that is in line with the ex ante ma-
nipulation of transfer prices for tax optimising reasons. This reduces trade quantities
for importing countries with higher tax rates than the exporting country and signific-
antly increases trade quantities with countries that exhibit lower tax rates. The effects
are strongly driven by the tax rate difference, which is as expected given that the tax
rate difference represents the incentive to manipulate transfer prices for profit shifting
purposes.
A potential shortcoming of our study is the focus on one industry. The automot-
ive industry is characterised by highly specialised products that are seldomly traded
with unrelated third parties, thus providing ample opportunities for the manipulation
of transfer prices. We would thus expect the effectiveness of TPR to decrease or even
vanish when looking at less specialised or more open sectors. Especially when looking
at intermediate goods trade as a whole, the positive effects of TPR on the reduction of
transfer mispricing in cases where the opportunities are manifold could be confounded
by the insignificance of TPR for other sectors of the economy.14 Given the significant
economic burden on companies and the tax administration, social desirability of TPR
depends on the extent of sectors present in an economy that have the opportunity to
excessively manipulate transfer prices. Our study adds to the discussion on the effect-
iveness of TPR that the allocative distortions through quantity reactions need to be
considered on top of the pricing reactions.
14This is confirmed in a specification that includes all industries. Here, no significant effect of TPR on
traded quantities can be found. Results are available from the author upon request.
18
References
Anderson, J. E. and E. Van Wincoop (2003): “Gravity with gravitas: a solution
to the border puzzle,” The American Economic Review, 93, 170–192.
Baltagi, B. H., P. Egger, and M. Pfaffermayr (2003): “A generalized design
for bilateral trade flow models,” Economics Letters, 80, 391–397.
——— (2014): “Panel data gravity models of international trade,” CESifo Working
Paper Series No. 4616.
Barrios, T., R. Diamond, G. W. Imbens, and M. Kolesa´r (2012): “Clustering,
spatial correlations, and randomization inference,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 107, 578–591.
Bartelsman, E. J. and R. M. Beetsma (2003): “Why pay more? Corporate tax
avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries,” Journal of Public Economics,
87, 2225–2252.
Beer, S. and J. Loeprick (2015): “Profit shifting: drivers of transfer (mis) pricing
and the potential of countermeasures,” International Tax and Public Finance, 22,
426–451.
Clausing, K. A. (2003): “Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade
prices,” Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2207–2223.
Cristea, A. D. and D. X. Nguyen (2013): “Transfer Pricing by Multinational
Firms: New Evidence from Foreign Firm Ownerships,” mimeo.
Davies, R. B., J. Martin, M. Parenti, and F. Toubal (2015): “Knocking on
Tax Haven’s Door: Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing,” CBT Working Papers
WP 15/01.
Deloitte (2015): “Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide,” Tech. rep.
Egger, P. and T. Seidel (2013): “Corporate taxes and intra-firm trade,” European
Economic Review, 63, 225–242.
Ernst&Young (2014): “Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide,” Tech. rep.
Fisher, R. A. (1935): “The design of experiments,” Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh.
Go´mez-Herrera, E. (2013): “Comparing alternative methods to estimate gravity
models of bilateral trade,” Empirical Economics, 44, 1087–1111.
19
Ho, D. E. and K. Imai (2006): “Randomization inference with natural experiments:
An analysis of ballot effects in the 2003 California recall election,” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 101, 888–900.
Huizinga, H. and L. Laeven (2008): “International profit shifting within multina-
tionals: A multi-country perspective,” Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1164–1182.
KPMG (2014): “Global Transfer Pricing Review,” Tech. rep.
Lohse, T. and N. Riedel (2013): “Do transfer pricing laws limit international income
shifting? Evidence from European multinationals,” Tech. rep., Oxford University
Centre for Business Taxation.
Loretz, S. (2008): “Corporate taxation in the OECD in a wider context,” Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 24, 639–660.
PWC (2016): “International Transfer Pricing Guide,” Tech. rep.
Silva, J. S. and S. Tenreyro (2006): “The log of gravity,” The Review of Economics
and statistics, 88, 641–658.
——— (2011): “Further simulation evidence on the performance of the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimator,” Economics Letters, 112, 220–222.
Tinbergen, J. (1962): Shaping the world economy; suggestions for an international
economic policy, Twentieth Century Fund, New York.
Zinn, T., N. Riedel, and C. Spengel (2014): “The Increasing Importance of Trans-
fer Pricing Regulations: A Worldwide Overview,” Intertax, 42, 352–404.
20
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
The Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences continues since 2015 the established “FZID Discussion 
Paper Series” of the “Centre for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID)” under the name “Hohenheim 
Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences”. 
 
Institutes 
 
510 Institute of Financial Management 
520 Institute of Economics 
530 Institute of Health Care & Public Management 
540 Institute of Communication Science 
550 Institute of Law and Social Sciences 
560 Institute of Economic and Business Education 
570 Institute of Marketing & Management 
580 Institute of Interorganizational Management & Performance 
 
Research Areas (since 2017) 
 
INEPA   “Inequality and Economic Policy Analysis” 
TKID   “Transformation der Kommunikation – Integration und Desintegration” 
NegoTrans  “Negotiation Research – Transformation, Technology, Media and Costs” 
INEF  “Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Finance” 
 
Download Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences  
from our homepage:  https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
01-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Philipp Baudy 
THE IMPACT OF TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK  
ON TRADE UNION WAGE SETTING: 
A Theoretical Analysis 
 
520 
02-2015 Fabian Wahl 
 
PARTICIPATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND  
CITY DEVELOPMENT 800-1800 
 
520 
03-2015 Tommaso Proietti, 
Martyna Marczak, 
Gianluigi Mazzi 
 
EUROMIND-D: A DENSITY ESTIMATE OF  
MONTHLY GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR  
THE EURO AREA 
520 
04-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Nathalie Chusseau, 
Joël Hellier 
 
OFFSHORING AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: 
MODELLING THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
520 
05-2015 Matthias Mueller, 
Kristina Bogner, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Muhamed Kudic 
 
SIMULATING KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION IN FOUR 
STRUCTURALLY DISTINCT NETWORKS  
– AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
520 
06-2015 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
BIDIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND EXCESS RETURNS: 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE WAVELET PERSPECTIVE 
 
520 
07-2015 Peng Nie, 
Galit Nimrod, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
INTERNET USE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING  
IN CHINA 
530 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
 08-2015 Fabian Wahl  
 
THE LONG SHADOW OF HISTORY 
ROMAN LEGACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
– EVIDENCE FROM THE GERMAN LIMES 
 
520 
09-2015 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
COMMUTE TIME AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN 
URBAN CHINA 
530 
10-2015 Kristina Bogner 
 
THE EFFECT OF PROJECT FUNDING ON 
INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE  
AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
 
520 
 
11-2015 Bogang Jun, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
ANALYTICAL MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK:  
THE EXPANDED REPRODUCTION SYSTEM 
 
520 
12-2015 Volker Grossmann 
Aderonke Osikominu 
Marius Osterfeld 
 
ARE SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR 
STUDYING A SCIENCE UNIVERSITY MAJOR? 
520 
 
13-2015 Martyna Marczak 
Tommaso Proietti 
Stefano Grassi 
A DATA–CLEANING AUGMENTED KALMAN FILTER 
FOR ROBUST ESTIMATION OF STATE SPACE 
MODELS 
 
520 
14-2015 Carolina Castagnetti 
Luisa Rosti 
Marina Töpfer 
 
THE REVERSAL OF THE GENDER PAY GAP AMONG 
PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED YOUNG EMPLOYEES 
520 
15-2015 Alexander Opitz DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA: 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 AND THE POLITICAL 
STOCK MARKET 
 
520 
    
01-2016 Michael Ahlheim,  
Jan Neidhardt 
NON-TRADING BEHAVIOUR IN CHOICE 
EXPERIMENTS 
 
520 
02-2016 Bogang Jun,  
Alexander Gerybadze, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
THE LEGACY OF FRIEDRICH LIST: THE EXPANSIVE 
REPRODUCTION SYSTEM AND THE KOREAN 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
520 
03-2016 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
FOOD INSECURITY AMONG OLDER EUROPEANS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF HEALTH, AGEING, 
AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE 
 
530 
04-2016 Peter Spahn POPULATION GROWTH, SAVING, INTEREST RATES 
AND STAGNATION. DISCUSSING THE EGGERTSSON-
MEHROTRA-MODEL 
 
520 
05-2016 Vincent Dekker, 
Kristina Strohmaier, 
Nicole Bosch 
A DATA-DRIVEN PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE THE 
BUNCHING WINDOW – AN APPLICATION TO THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
520 
06-2016 Philipp Baudy, 
Dario Cords 
DEREGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY 
EMPLOYMENT IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY: DOES 
THIS REALLY LEAD TO A SUBSTITUTION OF 
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT? 
 
520 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
07-2016 Robin Jessen,  
Davud Rostam-Afschar, 
Sebastian Schmitz 
 
HOW IMPORTANT IS PRECAUTIONARY LABOR 
SUPPLY? 
520 
08-2016 Peng Nie, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Jianhong Xue 
 
FUEL FOR LIFE: DOMESTIC COOKING FUELS 
AND WOMEN’S HEALTH IN RURAL CHINA 
530 
09-2016 Bogang Jun, 
Seung Kyu-Yi, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Matthias Müller 
 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION 
NETWORKS: COLLABORATION BETWEEN WEST 
AND EAST GERMANY FROM 1972 TO 2014 
 
520 
10-2016 Vladan Ivanovic, 
Vadim Kufenko, 
Boris Begovic 
Nenad Stanisic, 
Vincent Geloso 
 
CONTINUITY UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME. 
THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA 
520 
11-2016 David E. Bloom 
Michael Kuhn 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMALE HEALTH TO 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
520 
12-2016 Franz X. Hof 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE QUEST FOR STATUS AND R&D-BASED 
GROWTH 
520 
13-2016 Jung-In Yeon 
Andreas Pyka 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
 
STRUCTURAL SHIFT AND INCREASING VARIETY 
IN KOREA, 1960–2010: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL BY THE 
CREATION OF NEW SECTORS 
 
520 
14-2016 Benjamin Fuchs THE EFFECT OF TEENAGE EMPLOYMENT ON 
CHARACTER SKILLS, EXPECTATIONS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE STRATEGIES 
 
520 
15-2016 Seung-Kyu Yi 
Bogang Jun 
HAS THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION 
STRENGTHENED GERMANY’S NATIONAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM? TRIPLE HELIX DYNAMICS 
OF GERMANY’S INNOVATION SYSTEM 
 
520 
16-2016 Gregor Pfeifer 
Fabian Wahl 
Martyna Marczak 
 
ILLUMINATING THE WORLD CUP EFFECT: NIGHT 
LIGHTS EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
520 
17-2016 Malte Klein 
Andreas Sauer 
 
CELEBRATING 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION 
SYSTEM RESEARCH: WHAT YOU NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
 
570 
18-2016 Klaus Prettner THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATION FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE LABOR SHARE 
 
520 
19-2016 Klaus Prettner 
Andreas Schaefer 
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE FALL AND RISE 
OF INEQUALITY 
 
520 
20-2016 Vadim Kufenko 
Klaus Prettner 
YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT? 
ESTIMATOR CHOICE AND THE SPEED OF 
CONVERGENCE 
 
520 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
01-2017 Annarita Baldanzi 
Alberto Bucci 
Klaus Prettner 
 
CHILDRENS HEALTH, HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION, AND R&D-BASED ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
INEPA 
02-2017 Julius Tennert 
Marie Lambert 
Hans-Peter Burghof 
 
MORAL HAZARD IN VC-FINANCE: MORE 
EXPENSIVE THAN YOU THOUGHT  
INEF 
03-2017 Michael Ahlheim 
Oliver Frör 
Nguyen Minh Duc 
Antonia Rehl 
Ute Siepmann 
Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE 
RECONSIDERED 
520 
04-2017 Bohdan Kukharskyy 
Sebastian Seiffert 
GUN VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.: CORRELATES AND 
CAUSES 
 
520 
05-2017 Ana Abeliansky 
Klaus Prettner 
 
AUTOMATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 520 
06-2017 Vincent Geloso 
Vadim Kufenko 
 
INEQUALITY AND GUARD LABOR, OR 
PROHIBITION AND GUARD LABOR? 
INEPA 
07-2017 Emanuel Gasteiger 
Klaus Prettner 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTOMATION-INDUCED 
STAGNATION 
 
520 
08-2017 Klaus Prettner 
Holger Strulik 
THE LOST RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: 
AUTOMATION, EDUCATION, AND INEQUALITY IN 
AN R&D-BASED GROWTH MODEL 
 
INEPA 
09-2017 David E. Bloom 
Simiao Chen 
Michael Kuhn 
Mark E. McGovern 
Les Oxley 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC 
DISEASES: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 
CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA 
520 
10-2017 Sebastian Till Braun 
Nadja Dwenger 
THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT SHAPES REFUGEE 
INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM POST-WAR 
GERMANY 
 
INEPA 
11-2017 Vadim Kufenko 
Klaus Prettner 
Vincent Geloso 
 
DIVERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND THE 
HISTORY-AUGMENTED SOLOW MODEL 
 
INEPA 
12-2017 Frank M. Fossen 
Ray Rees 
Davud Rostam-Afschar 
Viktor Steiner 
 
HOW DO ENTREPRENEURIAL PORTFOLIOS 
RESPOND TO INCOME TAXATION? 
520 
13-2017 Steffen Otterbach 
Michael Rogan 
SPATIAL DIFFERENCES IN STUNTING AND 
HOUSEHOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: (RE-) EXAMINING THE LINKS 
USING NATIONAL PANEL SURVEY DATA 
 
INEPA 
14-2017 Carolina Castagnetti 
Luisa Rosti 
Marina Töpfer 
 
THE CONVERGENCE OF THE GENDER PAY GAP 
– AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION APPROACH 
INEPA 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
15-2017 Andreas Hecht ON THE DETERMINANTS OF SPECULATION – A 
CASE FOR EXTENDED DISCLOSURES IN 
CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
510 
16-2017 Mareike Schoop 
D. Marc Kilgour (Editors) 
 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON GROUP DECISION AND 
NEGOTIATION 
 
NegoTrans 
17-2017 Mareike Schoop 
D. Marc Kilgour (Editors) 
 
DOCTORAL CONSORTIUM OF THE 17TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GROUP 
DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 
 
NegoTrans 
18-2017 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Fabian Wahl 
 
SAVING BANKS AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION IN PRUSSIA 
SUPPORTING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
520 
19-2017 Stephanie Glaser A REVIEW OF SPATIAL ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
FOR COUNT DATA 
 
520 
20-2017 Dario Cords ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGY, MATCHING, AND 
LABOUR UNIONS: DOES LOW-SKILLED 
IMMIGRATION AFFECT THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
ALIGNMENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY? 
 
INEPA 
21-2017 Micha Kaiser 
Jan M. Bauer 
PRESCHOOL CHILD CARE AND CHILD WELL-
BEING IN GERMANY: DOES THE MIGRANT 
EXPERIENCE DIFFER? 
 
INEPA 
22-2017 Thilo R. Huning 
Fabian Wahl 
LORD OF THE LEMONS: ORIGIN AND DYNAMICS 
OF STATE CAPACITY 
 
520 
23-2017 Matthias Busse 
Ceren Erdogan 
Henning Mühlen 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS 
RELEVANCE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-
SHARAN AFRICA 
 
INEPA 
24-2017 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Alexander Opitz 
THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN THE 
FIRST GERMAN DEMOCRACY – EVIDENCE FROM 
THE BERLIN STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
520 
25-2017 Samuel Mburu 
Micha Kaiser 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
LIFESTOCK ASSET DYNAMICS AMONG 
PASTORALISTS IN NORTHERN KENYA 
INEPA 
26-2017 
 
Marina Töpfer DETAILED RIF DECOMPOSITION WITH 
SELECTION – THE GENDER PAY GAP IN ITALY 
 
INEPA 
27-2017 Robin Jessen 
Maria Metzing 
Davud Rostam-Afschar 
 
OPTIMAL TAXATION UNDER DIFFERENT 
CONCEPTS OF JUSTNESS 
INEPA 
28-2017 Alexander Kressner 
Katja Schimmelpfeng 
 
CLUSTERING SURGICAL PROCEDURES FOR 
MASTER SURGICAL SCHEDULING 
580 
29-2017 Clemens Lankisch 
Klaus Prettner 
Alexia Prskawetz 
 
ROBOTS AND THE SKILL PREMIUM: AN 
AUTOMATION-BASED EXPLANATION OF WAGE 
INEQUALITY 
INEPA 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
30-2017 Ann-Sophie Adelhelm 
Melanie Bathelt 
Mirjam Bathelt 
Bettina Bürkin 
Sascha Klein 
Sabrina Straub 
Lea Wagner 
Fabienne Walz 
 
ARBEITSWELT: DIGITAL – BELASTUNG: REAL? 
DER ERLEBTE WANDEL DER ARBEITSWELT 
INNERHALB DER IT-BRANCHE AUS SICHT DER 
ARBEITNEHMER 
550 
 
31-2017 Annarita Baldanzi 
Klaus Prettner 
Paul Tscheuschner 
LONGEVITY-INDUCED VERICAL INNOVATION 
AND THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN LIFE AND 
GROWTH 
 
520 
32-2017 Vincent Dekker 
Kristina Strohmaier 
THE EFFECT OF TRANSFER PRICING 
REGULATIONS ON INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
 
520 
FZID Discussion Papers 
(published 2009-2014) 
 
Competence Centers 
 
IK   Innovation and Knowledge 
ICT   Information Systems and Communication Systems 
CRFM   Corporate Finance and Risk Management 
HCM   Health Care Management 
CM   Communication Management 
MM   Marketing Management 
ECO  Economics 
  
 
Download FZID Discussion Papers from our homepage: https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/archiv_fzid_papers 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
01-2009 
 
Julian P. Christ 
 
NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY RELOADED: 
Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation 
 
 
IK 
02-2009 André P. Slowak MARKET FIELD STRUCTURE & DYNAMICS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AUTOMATION 
 
IK 
03-2009 Pier Paolo Saviotti, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
GENERALIZED BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
04-2009 Uwe Focht, Andreas 
Richter and Jörg 
Schiller 
 
INTERMEDIATION AND MATCHING IN INSURANCE MARKETS HCM 
05-2009 Julian P. Christ, 
André P. Slowak 
 
WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
IK 
06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO 
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
TIME: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries 
 
HCM 
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK  
09-2009 Ralf Richter, 
Jochen Streb 
CATCHING-UP AND FALLING BEHIND 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER FROM AMERICAN 
TO GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MAKERS 
IK 
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10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele, 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO 
11-2010 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM 
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO 
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO 
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK 
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK 
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM 
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT 
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM 
19-2010 Frauke Lammers, 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM 
20-2010 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO 
21-2010 Harald Degner, 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK 
22-2010 Heiko Stüber, 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO 
23-2010 Mark Spoerer, 
Jochen Streb 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
CONSUMPTION, 1933-38 
 
ECO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
24-2011 
 
Dhammika 
Dharmapala,  
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO 
25-2011 Michael Schuele, 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
 
ICT 
26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
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39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
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42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
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56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
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62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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